THE STARTLING DECLINE in U.S. aggregate labor productivity during the first three quarters of 1979 (a 2.3 percent decline in the nonfarm business sector at an annual rate) adds new urgency to the continuing concern about U.S. productivity behavior. Several important recent studies have documented a slowdown in the secular growth rate of productivity that has taken place in two stages, the first beginning after 1965 or 1966 and the second after 1973, and most studies appear to leave the causes of a large portion of the deceleration as an unresolved puzzle.1 Does the experience of 1979 suggest that a third stage of the secular slowdown has begun, or is this recent behavior consistent with previous occurrences at the same stage of the business cycle?
of the ratio of aggregate labor hours to potential hours, H/H*, in response to fluctuations in the ratio of actual to potential real output, Q/Q*:
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The assumption that the parameter of adjustment, ,B, is less than unity can be interpreted as reflecting the variability of capital utilization and the fixity of some portion of labor input.4
The statistical estimation of equation 1 cannot be done until a procedure is developed to construct time series for potential hours and real output. One of the two missing variables can be eliminated if it is assumed that "potential productivity," Q*/H*, grows at the exponential trend rate g: 
Regression Equations Relating Hours to Output
There is no attempt here to estimate the stark and simple version of the hours-adjustment equation represented by 3. Instead, all the estimates differ from 3 by including three lagged output terms and allowing for a broken time-trend. Rather than estimate three separate time-trends, all equations (except those covering subperiods) contain one time-trend for the entire period, a second trend to measure the extent and significance of a slowdown during 1966:1-1972:4 from the overall trend, and a third trend to measure the extent and significance of a slowdown during 1973:1-1977:4 from the overall trend.
I first estimated the equation using logs of the levels of both dependent Initially I assumed that it would be possible to explain the pattern of the residuals by some autoregressive process. For instance, if an inertial process in hiring caused a firm to base hiring plans of the current period on the outconle of the last period, one would expect a significant role to be played by lagged dependent variables. To test this hypothesis, four lagged values of the dependent variable were added to column 1 and every other equation presented in table 1. In no case was any lagged dependent variable significant, even at the 10 percent level. Another supposition was that firms might make systematic errors in predicting output by basing their expectations on an overly long moving average of past changes in output. But the addition of further lagged values of output to the equations in the table makes no important contribution, except to pick up a seasonal pattern.8 These negative findings apply not only to the equations estimated for the full sample period, but also to equations estimated separately for the first and second half of that period.
Specification of the 'End-of-Expansion" Effect
Although it does not appear possible to explain the mysterious residuals in any conventional sense, they can be "characterized" in an appealing and interesting way. Let the last phase of the business cycle expansion begin when the ratio of real GNP to potential real GNP, Q/Q*, reaches its peak. Until that time, real output has been rising faster than its long-run trend, 8. Estimates of the equations with eight lagged output terms were presented to the Brookings panel, and several participants commented that the significant zig-zag pattern of the weights on lags four and five might be a reflection of seasonality in the underlying data. As many as sixteen lags were also included with no improvement in fit. and thus business firms may have discovered that their real sales have outstripped their previous plans and expectations, requiring upward revisions of plans for both hiring and capital investment. Managers of individual firms, each buoyed by a series of quarters when business was better than expected, may feel justified in extrapolating this performance into the future. Given the economy's limited capacity to produce, the realization of each of their plans in some episodes would have required that each firm simultaneously raise its market share.
A dummy variable can be created that captures this end-of-expansion effect. Each episode of overhiring is constrained to commence in the quarter after the peak quarter of Q/Q*, which for the five business cycles since Several additional equations are presented in table 1 to determine whether the significance of the EOE effect is attributable to a particular business cycle, or rather reflects a phenomenon that operates during each cycle. Column 3 is identical to column 2 but allows a separate value of the EOE variable to enter after 1973: 1. The coefficient on this variable would be zero if the behavior of productivity during the 1973-74 episode were the same as the average of the previous cycles, and would be positive if there were a greater tendency toward excess staffing and slack productivity in that episode. It is apparent that the 1973-74 episode was unusual because it had a cumulative excess hiring of 2.01 percentage points over the "normal" EOE effect of 1.80 percent, for a total of 3.81 percent. Despite this feature of the 1973-74 period, the coefficient on the overall EOE effect drops only slightly in moving from column 2 to 3, and its t-statistic is still a robust 4.23.
Columns 4 Several suggestions have been made to explain the EOE phenomenon as being consistent with rational profit-maximizing behavior. One is that labor and capital may be interdependent factors of production. In periods when capital investment is relatively high, additional employees may be required to install new equipment, and experienced employees may have to work overtime to train new employees. These "installation costs" decrease when investment is low. To test this proposition, the detrended ratio of fixed nonresidential investment to potential GNP was entered into the basic equation (column 3) in the form of both its level and first difference. The t-statistics were minuscule, and the size of the EOE coefficients was not affected.
A second suggestion is that firms maintain some slack in their labor force when the quit rate is high to guard against being caught short- handed. This slack subsequently disappears during periods when the quit rate is low and firms no longer are concerned that key employees may depart. Both the level and first difference of the quit rate in manufacturing were added to the basic equation in column 3 with the same negative outcome as that of investment; t-statistics were below the margin of significance, while the EOE coefficients were unaffected.
A final set of tests investigated the statistical legitimacy of the form of the equations in table 1. In principle, the relationship between output and hours could be tested with either hours or output on the left-hand side of the equation to be estimated. European countries.17 In each case, an external event could be identified by contemporary accounts to help date and describe the phenomenon captured by the dummy variables. In this paper, the end-of-expansion dummy variables are statistically significant and operate consistently across business cycles, but their interpretation is more conjectural. My conjecture is that the phenomenon stems from mistaken expectations and from inertia in changing personnel budgets. Although no direct evidence is presented here that misperceptions actually occurred, the data are consistent with my imposed constraint that the dummy variable sums to zero, thus forcing any end-of-expansion overstaffing to be eliminated in subsequent periods. One might liken the EOE effect to other phenomena in economic timeseries involving overshooting-including booms in the stock market and overbuilding in the commercial construction industry. Yet at a deeper level, these two examples of overshooting are different in nature. Participants in the stock market deal in an auction market in which there is no inertia beyond the expectations of other market participants to limit price movements, and no external guidepost exists to indicate a "correct" level of prices. Expectations in September 1929 were incorrect only ex post and did not appear so at the time. In commercial construction, however, overbuilding may result from the long lags between decisionmaking and project completion, imparting an inertia to the time-series on nonresidential construction that is familiar to students of business cycles. The end-of-expansion phenomenon of overstaffing may result from a similar lag between business decisions that set personnel budgets and the actual hiring, training, and promotions. Business firms may not be irrational or even guilty of mistaken expectations at the time that the personnel budgets are set. Rather, they may gradually recognize an overstaffing condition but be unable to correct it rapidly because of both the high costs of more frequent decisionmaking and the inevitable time it takes to prune the work force purely by attrition when layoffs are costly.
At the more immediate level of current policy discussions, the results in this paper suggest that standard equations may tend regularly to overpredict productivity growth during the interval following the cyclical peak in the ratio of actual to potential output. A corollary is the tendency for simple versions of "Okun's law" to fail to explain why unemployment remains so low and employment so high at the end of expansions and the beginning of contractions.18 Thus current forecasts based on conventional productivity equations may be unduly pessimistic about the increase in unemployment that will occur during late 1979 and early 1980, but overly optimistic for subsequent periods.
Discussion
BOTH William Poole and Robert Hall pointed out that an "end-of-expansion" effect could only characterize the data ex post. Tnat effect could not characterize the decision process of businesses in hiring, however, because businesses could not know the expansion was ending. Hall reasoned that lags in the hiring process must lie at the heart of the productivity shortfalls that Robert Gordon identifies.
Charles Holt asked for more work on the theoretical aspects of the hiring and employment process that might explain Gordon's productivity variables. He reasoned that high turnover rates could cut into productivity because they required more training and on-the-job learning and also because they led employers to keep a larger buffer of workers on the payroll and made it more difficult for them to correct hiring mistakes because layoffs were low. Such a process might fruitfully be tested more thoroughly than Gordon had been able to do in this paper. Lacking any convincing explanation for the dummy variables in the regressions, several participants, and Gordon himself, emphasized that those variables describe an interesting phenomenon rather than explain it.
18. Arthur Okun is well aware of this problem and in fact has explained the low level of unemployment in 1974 in these terms: "I believe that the principal explanation lies in the momentum and overoptimism of personnel policies." See Arthur M. Okun, "Unemployment and Output in 1974," BPEA, 2:1974, p. 503.
